Libya

Berbers have inhabited central north Africa since ancient times, but the region has been settled and ruled by Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Vandals. In the the 7th century, Islam spread through the region; in the mid-16th century, Ottoman rule began. The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when they were defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951.

Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar al-QADHAFI assumed leadership and began to espouse his political system at home, which was a combination of socialism and Islam. During the 1970s, QADHAFI used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversive and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners - one over Scotland, another in Northern Africa - and a discotheque bombing in Berlin.

UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically and economically following the attacks; sanctions were lifted in 2003 following Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombings and agreement to claimant compensation. QADHAFI also agreed to end Libya's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and he made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations.

Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. QADHAFI's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned an eight-month civil war that saw UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the international community, the toppling of the QADHAFI regime, and the setting up of a National Transitional Council (NTC). In 2012, the NTC handed power to an elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Voters chose a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014 - the House of Representatives (HoR), which relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk after fighting broke out in Tripoli and Benghazi in July 2014.

In December 2015, the UN brokered an agreement among a broad array of Libyan political parties and social groups - known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Members of the Libyan Political Dialogue signed the LPA in December 2015. In January 2016, The HoR and defunct-GNC-affiliated political hardliners continued to oppose the GNA and hamper the LPA’s implementation. In September 2017, UN Special Representative Ghassan SALAME announced a new roadmap for national political reconciliation.

In November 2018, the international partners supported SALAME’s recalibrated Action Plan for Libya that aimed to break the political deadlock by holding a National Conference, subsequently held in early 2019, but attendees failed to reach an agreement. Despite continued clashes since then, the warring parties agreed to a UN-administered ceasefire in October 2020. In early 2021, the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum selected an interim president and prime minister of its executive council. The council was charged with preparing for December 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s.

Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.

By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya.

As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin.

The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.

While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers.

In addition, more than 200,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2017 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.

chief of state:

Chairman, Presidential Council, Mohammed Al MENFI (since 5 February 2021)

head of government:

Prime Minister Abdul Hamid DBEIBEH (since 5 February 2021)

cabinet:

GNA Presidency Council (pending approval by the House of Representatives - as of December 2018)

elections/appointments:

election originally scheduled for 24 December 2021, but will likely be postponed by the election commission until a list of candidates is resolved

election results:

on 5 February 2021, a UN-led forum elected - in a runoff - Mohammed Al MENFI chairman, Presidential Council and Abdul Hamid DBEIBEH, prime minister

chief of mission:

Ambassador Richard B. NORLAND (since 22 August 2019)

embassy:

Sidi Slim Area/Walie Al-Ahed Road, Tripoli (temporarily closed)

mailing address:

8850 Tripoli Place, Washington, DC 20521-8850

telephone:

[216] 71-107-000

email address and website:

[email protected]; https://ly.usembassy.gov/

note: the US Embassy in Tripoli closed in July 2014 due to fighting near the embassy related to Libyan civil unrest; embassy staff and operations temporarily first relocated to Valetta, Malta and currently are temporarily relocated to Tunis, Tunisia

name:

Libya, Libya, Libya

lyrics/music:

Al Bashir AL AREBI/Mohamad Abdel WAHAB

note: also known as "Ya Beladi" or "Oh, My Country!"; adopted 1951; readopted 2011 with some modification to the lyrics; during the QADHAFI years between 1969 and 2011,

the anthem was "Allahu Akbar," (God is Great) a marching song of the Egyptian Army in the 1956 Suez War

Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation.

The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day.

The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage.

general assessment:

• political and security instability in Libya has disrupted its telecom sector, as warring factions make mobile towers a target and construction workers regularly cut cables by mistake;
• much of its infrastructure remains superior to that in most other African countries;
• rival operators fight for control;
• investment in fiber backbone and upgrades to international cables;
• limited LTE and 5G service;
• some satellite broadband;
• Chinese companies have heavily invested in Libyan infrastructure and now dominate the telecommunications sector;
• in 2021 Libya signed deals and projects with US firms to upgrade portions of its infrastructure, increasing the diversity of its telecommunications networks (2021)

domestic:

24 per 100 fixed-line and 91 per 100 mobile-cellular subscriptions; service generally adequate (2019)

international:

• country code - 218;
• landing points for LFON, EIG, Italy-Libya, Silphium and Tobrok-Emasaed submarine cable system connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia;
• satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat, Arabsat, and Intersputnik;
• microwave radio relay to Tunisia and Egypt;
• tropospheric scatter to Greece;
• participant in Medarabtel (2019)

note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production;

many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes;

the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments

Libya lacks a nationwide military and the interim government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), relies on its cooperation with disparate militias that it cannot entirely control for security; the GNU has access to various ground, air, and naval/coast guard forces comprised of a mix of semi-regular military units, militias, civilian volunteers, and foreign troops and mercenaries

the Libyan National Army (LNA), under de facto LNA commander Khalifa HAFTER, also includes various ground, air, and naval units comprised of semi-regular military personnel, militias, and foreign troops and mercenaries; as of late 2021, the LNA continued to operate independently from the GNU and exerted influence throughout eastern, central, and southern Libya (2021)

in April 2019, Libyan National Army (LNA) forces launched an offensive to seize the capital, Tripoli, from the UN-recognized GNU (aka Government of National Accord or GNA); the GNU and its local supporting militia forces forced the LNA to withdraw by June 2020; at the signing of a UN-sponsored ceasefire in October 2020, GNU and LNA forces were separated by a line of control running roughly from the coastal city of Sirte south to the vicinity of Al Jufra and Brak;

as of late 2021, this line had grown increasingly fortified; in April 2021, the UN Security Council endorsed plans to deploy civilian ceasefire monitoring personnel at the request of the Libyans

outside actors have played a large role in the fighting in Libya on both sides:

as of 2021, GNU forces were backed militarily by Qatar and Turkey; Turkey has been the chief supporter; it signed a security agreement with the GNU in 2019, and Turkey’s aid was assessed as vital in turning back the LNA offensive in 2019-2020; Turkey’s support has included air defense, unmanned aerial vehicles (aka drones), equipment, weapons, training, and military personnel, including advisors, technicians, and equipment operators; in addition, Turkey has provided as many as 5,000 mercenary fighters from Syria

as of 2021, LNA forces (aka Libyan Arab Armed Forces, LAAF) have received varying amounts of military support from Chad, Egypt, France, Jordan, Russia, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); Russia, Sudan, and the UAE have been the most active; Russia has provided equipment, weapons, aircraft, and air defense support, as well as an estimated 5,000 Russian mercenaries/private military contractors and Russian-sponsored Syrian mercenary fighters;

Sudan reportedly provided at least 1,000 troops from its Rapid Support Forces in 2019-2020 and more than 1,000 Sudanese mercenaries were present in Libya as of late 2021; the UAE provided equipment, supplies, weapons, and air support, including air strikes from manned and unmanned aircraft;

meanwhile, Egypt has provided arms, supplies, and training, as well as facilitated both Emirati and Russian operations in Libya by allowing them to use the country’s western bases and to transport arms over the border

as of late 2021, it was estimated that as many as 20,000 third-country nationals were involved in military operations in Libya, despite the confidence building measure of the October 2020 ceasefire that called for all foreign forces to leave the country by early 2021; in addition to the military and proxy forces provided by Russia, Sudan, and Turkey, foreign fighters from Libya’s neighbors (Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia, as well as Sudan) have travelled to Libya since the civil war began in 2011 to support various armed groups, including those aligned with the GNU and the LNA, as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham and Al Qa’ida terrorist group affiliates operating in Libya; most of these fighters arrived as individuals, but rebel groups from Chad and Sudan were also reportedly involved in the fighting